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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for property damage arising 
from the loss of the contents of a laboratory flask. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury in December 1977. 
The jury returned a special verdict finding plaintiff 
thirty per cent negligent and defendant seventy per cent 
negligent in causing the loss. The jury found damages 
to plaintiff in the amount of $65,197.00. The lower 
court entered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of 
$45,637.90 with costs. The lower court thereafter denied 
defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and a new trial on all issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This lawsuit arises out of an incident which 
occurred upon the business premises of Gull Laboratories,-
Inc., sometime during the last half of February 1976. 
At that time, plaintiff-respondent Gull Labora-
tories, Inc., (hereinafter "Gull") was an experimental 
laboratory in the process of starting up a business to 
produce diagnostic products and services. 
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Defendant-appellant Louis A. Roser Company (here-
inafter "Roser") was in the business of selling, instal-
ling and servicing industrial refrigeration equipment. 
The evidence is conflicting as to whether the 
events giving rise to the incident occurred during the 
week of February 16-23 or February 23-27, 1976. (R528, 586, 
667,671-72) Towardsthebeginning of the week in question, 
some of Gull's employees observed a malfunction in the 
operation of a small walk-in cooler within the laboratory 
Gull leases from Fur Breeders Agricultural Cooperative. 
(R528) Gull alerted Fur Breeders' office which sent 
repairmen to try to correct the problem. (R Id.) The 
repairmen visited the laboratory sometime between 
Wednesday and Friday of the week in question, but were 
unable to correct the specific malfunction. Fur Breeders' 
repairmen then called defendant-appellant Roser and asked 
that a serviceman be sent out to work on the cooler. 
(R528) 
On Friday afternoon, Roser's lead repairman Elmer 
J. Meyer made a service call at Gull Laboratories. (R667) 
Upon arrival, Mr. Meyer was taken to the laboratory 
cooler by one of Gull's lab technicians, Jack Carpenter. 
(R662, 690-91) The lab cooler is located between the 
laboratory and glassware preparation room. Together 
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these rooms comprise the west portion of Gull's business 
premises. (R530, 647) The dimensions of the cooler are 
approximately 12'x6'x8', and it is entered through a door 
on the east side of the cooler. (R556, 663) 
The refrigeration unit Roser was called upon to 
service is suspended from the ceiling in the southwest 
corner of the cooler, the bottom of the unit being approxi-
mately 5-1/2' above the cooler floor. (R648-49) On the 
south wall of the cooler are four shelves (RSSS, 664) 
used to store chemicals; the top shelf lies approximately 
10" below the bottom of the refrigeration unit. The com-
pressor for the cooler is located outside on the north 
wall of the cooler. (R648) 
Mr. Meyer was familiar with the equipment involved 
(R643, 646) and quickly conunenced repairs. Meyer asked 
Carpenter for a small step ladder (R649, 691) so that he 
could more easily reach the unit. (R656) The evidence 
is in conflict as to whether Mr. Meyer was furnished with 
a step ladder or a small portable stool, but regardless, 
one or the other was made available to and used by Meyer. 
(R649-50, 663, 691) 
Mr. Meyer testified that while in the cooler the 
only materials he touched were upon the top shelf on the 
south side of the cooler (R664, 667), the shelf nearest 
-3-
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in proximity to the refrigeration unit. Meyer carefully 
moved some of the vials and flasks on that shelf to the 
side to clear them from the work area and provide him 
with a clear space upon which to place his tools. (R664) 
Meyer further testified that, while in the cooler, he 
did not hear any bottles or flasks tip over, nor did he 
notice any spillage. (R657, 667-68) After servicing 
the unit within the cooler, Meyer made adjustments to 
the compressor located on the outer wall of the cooler. 
(R650-51) He then left Gull Laboratories. While the 
evidence indicates that Mr. Meyer's visit left some dirt 
and grime within the laboratory near the cooler (R529, 
588, 692, 723), there is no evidence of any lack of care 
or cleanliness on Meyer's part within the cooler itself. 
Sometime during the week following Meyer's ser-
vice call to Gull Laboratories, Roser was informed by 
one of Gull's agents that there had been a vial spil-
lage discovered in the lab cooler after Mr. Meyer's 
visit. (R443) Roser's operating manager, Mr. Glenn A. 
Roser, Jr., thereafter called Gull's office to offer 
assistance. (R442) 
Mr. Roser spoke with Dr. Myron Wentz, primary 
owner of Gull, who informed Mr. Roser that following 
the Roser serviceman's visit, an Ehrlenmeyer Flask had 
-4-
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been found tipped over on its shelf in the cooler with 
its contents spilled down the side of the wall and onto 
the floor of the walk-in cooler. (R536-37) Mr. Wentz 
did not allege that anyone had witnessed the accident, 
only that the spillage had been discovered, and Gull 
intended to hold Roser responsible. 
The flask contained a conjugate which Gull inten-
ded to use, in diluted form, as a part of a testing kit 
for diagnosing three of the four viral diseases caused 
by the Herpes virus. ( R4 9 5) Hopefully, the kit was to 
be marketed, conditions permitting, sometime after May 
1976. ( R506 et ~) In testing disease, the diluted 
conjugate is applied to a rniscroscope slide (known as 
a substrate) containing a cell or tissue infected by 
the specific disease being tested for (RS07) and to which 
blood serum from the person being tested had been applied. 
If the person has had the disease for some time, his/her 
body system will have built up specific antibodies against 
the disease. (RSlO) If present in the applied serum, 
these antibodies will attack the virus in the infected 
cell or tissue. (R Id.) If this occurs, the diagnosis 
is that the person has the specific disease, even though 
the virus itself may be incapable of detection. (R. Id.) 
This joining of the viral particle and specific antibody 
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are unobservable even under a microscope without the use 
of the conjugate. (RSll-12) The conjugate contains 
other antibodies which latch onto the antibodies in the 
patient's serum in the same way as the patient's anti-
bodies latch onto the viral particle. (RSll) When 
treated with a fluorescein, the antibodies within the 
conjugate act as a marker, making the linkage of the 
antibodies and viral particles observable through the 
use of a special microscope. (RSll-12) 
The conjugate, in this instance, was anti-human 
globulin prepared from an animal serum. To prepare the 
conjugate, human blood is drawn from the donor and 
allowed to clot. The globulins (natural human anti-
bodies within the blood) ooze out of the clot as serum 
which in then collected. Through various laboratory 
techniques, the preparer then seeks to isolate the spe-
cific globulin or globulins for the disease he wishes 
to test for, in this case the herpes virus. These iso-
lated substances are known as antigens. In this instance, 
the specific antigens isolated were identified as IgA, 
IgG and IgM. (R512-13) Each antigen is then injected 
into an animal, in this case a goat. (RSll) The goat's 
system views the injected antigen as foreign substance 
and builds up its own antibodies to the antigens, in this 
case the human antibodies. 
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After allowing the animal's system to build up the 
antibodies for a period of time, the goats are then bled, 
and their serum tested to determine the titer, or quality 
concentration, of antibodies in the specific serum. The 
goat serum is then fractionated. This process hopefully 
results in additional purification and a serum of suffi-
cient quality and titer for the particular test you wish 
to run. The titer must be high enough to provide maxi-
mum brilliancy when viewed under the fluorescein micro-
scope, yet must fall within the range of permissible 
titers for that particular test as established by govern-
ment testing agencies. 
The serum is then conjugated. In conjugation, 
fluorescein is added to the serum in predetermined amounts 
to provide a "tagging" effect when viewed under a fluores-
cein microscope. (R507) When applied to the substrate, 
the conjugated antibodies from the goat serum attack the 
specific antibodies in the patient's serum in the same 
manner as when the human antibodies were initially injec-
ted into the goat in the form of antigens. If the test 
components have been properly prepared, the conjugate will 
not react unless the specific antibody which was injected 
into the goat is present in the patient's serum. (RSll-12) 
It is very important that both the antigen and the 
conjugate be carefully prepared as as to be monospecif ic 
-7-
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for the particular antibody you wish to produce. (R512-
13) The same is true of the viral particle on the sub-
strate slide vis-a-vis the disease for which you are 
testing. If antibodies other than those of the disease 
being tested for are present in the conjugate, they will 
couple with similar antibodies in the patient's serum 
and produce a positive test. This result will occur even 
in the absence of the viral disease for which you are 
testing. 
Conjugates for such diagnostic testing can be pur-
chased commercially or prepared individually. Gull states 
that it chose to prepare its own so as to be able to more 
carefully control the quality of the test. (RSlS-17) 
Gull claims that the special techniques which went into 
the preparation of its conjugate created a unique product. 
Dr. Wentz testified that the conjugate's unique nature was 
derived from the specificity of reaction between the viral 
particle on the substrate slide and the "tagged" antibody 
from the patient's serum. Dr. Wentz also testified that 
the conjugate was of a sufficiently high titer to produce 
a reactive brilliancy under the microscope which could not 
be attained through the use of commercially obtainable 
conjugates. (R609-10) 
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This alleged uniqueness was controverted by evi-
dence showing that the conjugate had never been tested 
against commercially prepared conjugates outside of Gull's 
own testing system. (RS75) Furthermore, testimony by the 
president of a competing microbiological research labora-
tory, Dr. Nadeem Muna, was to the effect that there were 
commercially available conjugates which would perform 
acceptably for Gull's needs. (R694) Dr. Muna also tes-
tified that the Gull process was not unique, implement-
ing only standard technology. (R695) 
Whatever its worth, Gull had produced 104 ml. of 
a conjugate which was stored in a 250-ml. uncapped 
Ehrlenmeyer Flask. This flask was positioned upon the 
"middle" shelf on the left side of the lab cooler during 
the afternoon in question. (R591) Testimony adduced at 
trial indicated that the flask was found lying on its 
side, on that same shelf, sometime after Mr. Meyer had 
completed repairs within the cooler. 
The evidence is conflicting as to whether the con-
tents of the flask were a total loss. Dr. Wentz claims 
that the amount of conjugate remaining in the toppled 
flask was insignificant (R734) and the spilled contents 
unsalvageable. (Rid.) Dr. Muna, on the other hand, 
testified as to procedures Gull could have used to sal-
vage a portion of the contents and return them to usable 
-9-
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form. (R 706) He also illustrated, by example, how a 
substantial portion of the conjugate should have remained 
in the tipped flask. (R707-709) Nevertheless, during 
the week following the accident, Dr. Wentz met with ano-
ther Gull agent, Mr. David Gillen, and with Mr. Gillen's 
assistance, prepared a document to be submitted as a 
claim against Roser alleging the conjugate to be a total 
loss. This document, which contained Dr. Wentz's esti-
mates of the cost to reproduce the lost conjugate, was 
introduced at trial as Defendant's Exhibit "16". (R578-
81) 
Later at trial, however, Gull introduced Plain-
tiff's Exhibit "13", which was purported to be a sununary 
from Gull's records of the actual cost to reproduce the 
lost conjugate. (R559-61) The exhibit was admitted over 
counsel's objection that the sununary was in violation of 
the best-evidence rule. (R561) Although many of the 
figures on Exhibit Pl3 closely approximate Gull's ori-
ginal estimates on Exhibit Dl6, there is a large dis-
parity between the estimated laboratory processing costs 
for the conjugate shown on the two exhibits. 
Dr. Wentz claims the discrepancy is a result of 
Gull's inability to reproduce an identical conjugate, 
despite time-consuming attempts to do so. Following the 
-10-
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accident, Gull decided against re-immunization. The deci-
sion was largely attributable to the fact that the IgM 
antigen, which Dr. Wentz claims was the key component of 
the original conjugate (R514, 571) had been expended in 
the original immunization and an additional supply was 
unobtainable. (R572) That antigen had not been prepared 
by Gull, but by Dr. Stephen St. Joer at Penn State Uni-
versity. (R572) 
Gull was eventually able to reproduce two of the 
tests contemplated in the original kit through the use of 
bleedings taken from the original goats. These bleedings 
had been taken concurrently with those used to produce 
the lost conjugate, but were not considered optimum at 
the time. Through undisclosed purification procedures, 
Gull was able to use those bleedings to produce a sub-
stitute conjugate with satisfactory results. (R603) 
This procedure, however, is claimed to have resulted 
in higher costs than originally estimated. 
At trial, the court also allowed, over counsel's 
objections, evidence and testimony as to the costs incurred 
by Gull in: (1) Starting up the laboratory. The admitted 
evidence showed the extent of Dr. Wentz's initial invest-
ment in the laboratory, including indebtedness incurred. 
(RSOO, 503) (2) Operation of a laboratory. The admitted 
-11-
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testimony included cost estimates of laboratory equip-
ment and inventory (R498, 504), as well as the salaries 
paid Dr. Wentz and his employees. (R502-03) (3) Market 
value of lost conjugate. Although no market for the pro-
duct had been established at trial, the court allowed 
both testimony by Dr. Wentz and argument by Mr. Richman 
as to the market value of the conjugate in completed 
form. (R555, 596, 615, 625) Thusly, evidence of lost 
sales and profits from the conjugate was allowed to reach 
the jurors for use in their deliberations despite previ-
ous instruction by the court to Mr. Richman that such 
evidence was to be inadmissible on the grounds of relat-
ing to a new business. (R554-55) 
The special verdict returned by the jurors found 
Gull to have been 30% negligent in causing the loss of 
the conjugate and Roser to have been a 70% cause. 
were found for Gull in the amount of $65,197.00. 
Damages 
This 
amount is identical to that shown as the cost to repro-
duce the lost conjugate set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"13". 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
enumerates the permissible grounds upon which the court 
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is justified in granting a new trial. Defendant's peti-
tion for relief is founded upon the following bases con-
tained therein: 
(a) Grounds 
* * * 
(1) Irregularities in the proceed-
ings of the court, jury * * * by which 
either party was prevented from having 
a fair trial. 
* * * 
(3) Accident or suprise, which 
ordinary prudence could not have guar-
ded against. 
* * * 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against the law. 
(7) Error in law. 
POINT I 
The Court Committed Prejudicial Error 
In Receiving Exhibit P-13 in Evidence. 
A. The court erred in admitting Exhibit P-13 in 
evidence. 
The record shows that Gull claimed Exhibit P-13 as 
a summary of that portion of its business records pertain-
ing to the cost to reproduce the lost conjugate. On page 
559, beginning at line 6, it reads: 
-13-
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Q Dr. Wentz, I had you what has been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-13 and ask you if you 
can identify that? 
A This is an itemizing of the costs to repro-
duce the conjugate based on company records 
as to costs incurred. 
Q You call them "company records," are they 
your records? 
A Yes. 
Q And who prepared the items on Exhibit P-13? 
A These were prepared by myself. 
Q And what were you referring to when you pre-
pared those items and made those computations? 
A I took into consideration all facets that 
dealt specifically with remaking this conju-
ate. 
Q Were those obtained from your business records? 
A Yes, they were. 
Q And the first item you have on there is what? 
Mr. Berry: Your Honor, I object on the ground there is 
no proper foundation laid for the admission 
of this exhibit. 
The Court: Have you shown this exhibit to counsel? 
Mr. 
Richman: Yes, he has a copy. 
Mr. Berry: Seems to me like his books and records would 
be the best evidence of whatever it cost, if 
that's what it's intended to prove. 
The Court: Is this a summation of what is on the books 
and records? 
Mr. 
Richman: Part of the books and records he kept himself. 
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Mr. Berry: I don't think it's on the books and records, 
your Honor. I haven't seen it on the books. 
The Court: Overruled. That will be subject to cross-
examination, and I'll let him answer. 
(Emphasis added] 
Regardless of what Gull now chooses to designate 
the exhibit (Rl95, but see assertions at Rl69, 586), 
there can be no doubt that the jurors regarded the exhi-
bit as a summary of allegedly existing business records 
and, upon receipt of the exhibit into evidence, weighed 
it as such. Gull is, therefore, now estopped to deny its 
claim that P-13 is a summary and is consequently bound by 
the law pertaining thereto. 
Admitting the introduction of a summary of busi-
ness as an exception to hearsay evidence is a rule of con-
venience only. B. Jones, Evidence, at 473 (5th Ed. 1958). 
The rule is stated in Jones on Evidence: 
§244--Summaries of Multiple Writings.--
Another exception to the best evidence 
rule, based on necessity, arises when the 
primary source of proof consists of numer-
ous documents which cannot be conveniently 
examined in court, and the fact to be proved 
can only be ascertained by an examination 
of the whole collection. It is well estab-
lished that in such a case a summary * * * 
may be given in evidence by any person who 
has examined the documents and who is skilled 
in such matters, provided the result is capa-
ble of being ascertained by calculation. 
* * * 
-15-
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To the application of this rule, it 
is essential that the original records or 
writings be first duly identified and that 
a sufficient foundation be laid so as to 
entitle the records or writings themselves 
to be admitted in evidence. Also, the 
admissibility of the records themselves 
as evidence must be established, and they 
must be available to the opposite party 
for cross-examination. (Emphasis added] 
Utah follows a rule that requires before admission 
of a summary that the records be produced and made availa-
ble to the opposite party for purposes of cross-examination. 
In Sprague, et al., v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Company, 4 
Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956), in an action by a gen-
eral contractor and surety to recover damages for breach 
of contract, the court said: 
It has been held, and we believe the ruling 
to be a salutary and expedient one, that 
where original book entries, documents or 
other data are so numerous, complex or cum-
bersome that they cannot be conveniently 
examined by the fact trier, or where it 
would materially aid the court and the par-
ties in analyzing such material, that a 
competent person who has made such examina-
tion may present such evidence. This is 
subject to the limitation that the evidence 
must be shown to be developed from records, 
books or documents, the competency of which 
has been established, the records must be 
available for examination by the opposing 
parties, and the witnesses subJect to cross-
examination concerning such evidence. * * * 
(Emphasis added] 
In Nalder v. Kellogg Sales Company, 6 Utah 2d 367, 
314 P.2d 350 (1957), the court said a summary of profit 
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and loss statements was inadmissible where it was not 
shown to have been prepared by a person competent to do 
so, who was subject to cross-examination, or based on 
other records and data available for examination. 
An earlier federal case emphasizing the same 
points is Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co., et al., v. St. 
Louis Railroad, et al., 80 F.2d 32 (1935). In Berthold-
Jennings the Court said: 
While, under certain limitations, an 
expert may give a summary of his exami-
nation of voluminous records, if proper 
foundation has been laid, with reference 
to such records so as to make them com-
petent evidence, still to be admissible 
the records must at least be produced 
and made available to the opposite party 
for the purpose of cross-examination. 
80 F.2d at 44 
In applying these principles to the facts of this 
case, it is evident that the court erred in admitting the 
exhibit. The record shows that the exhibit was admitted 
over defendant's vigorous objection and motion that the 
testimony relative to Exhibit P-13 be stricken. (R561) 
In contrast to the rule stated previously, Jones 
on Evidence, supra, the records and books from which the 
summary was compiled were never sufficiently identified 
so as to make ascertainable exactly what went into the 
total of $65,197.00 Gull claims as the cost of reproduc-
ing the lost conjugate. 
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No sufficient foundation was laid to allow the 
records to be admitted into evidence, even should they 
exist. The record contains no testimony indicating the 
type or regularity of the entries, the accounting pro-
cedures used or even whether the computations had been 
rechecked for errors, despite the fact that Dr. Wentz 
admitted that any records kept were not kept in great 
detail. (R57 3) 
The record is also void of any testimony that Dr. 
Wentz was the custodian of the records, but alleges only 
that records were kept. Thus, an additional basis for 
excluding the exhibit is established--the evidence was 
not submitted by a person possessing the requisite com-
petence. Without testimony establishing himself as the 
custodian of the records, Dr. Wentz is unable to testify 
as to the validity of the originals and, ~ fortiari, the 
summary. 
Furthermore, the original records were not availa-
ble for examination for the opposing party. Mr. Richman 
offered to supply the original records only if subpoenaed 
by the court. (R584, 586) The burden of production, how-
ever, is on the party seeking admission of the evidence. 
Although the record clearly shows that Gull failed to 
sustain this burden, the court nevertheless admitted the 
exhibit into evidence. 
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B. The court's error in admitting the evidence 
was prejudicial. 
If in answering the Special Verdict the jury had 
come up with a figure for damages other than $65,197.00, 
it might be argued that the receipt of Exhibit P-13 into 
evidence was merely harmless error. However, it seems 
clear that Exhibit P-13 was the only evidence employed 
by the jury in affixing the amount of damages. 
Gull's original estimate of the cost to reproduce 
the lost conjugate was properly admitted as Exhibit D-16. 
Exhibit P-13 was later introduced containing conflicting 
estimates. (R 584, lines 1-9) While Dr. Wentz's testi-
mony attempted to reconcile the discrepancies between 
several of the items contained in the two estimates (R582-
83, 585-86), there is no evidence on the record indicat-
ing any basis for the discrepancy between the conflicting 
processing component estimates of $14,400 and $62,400. 
In the absence of any substantiating evidence reconcil-
ing these discrepancies, it becomes obvious that the only 
source from which the jurors could have derived the 
$65,197.00 figure was the improperly admitted Exhibit 
P-13. 
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POINT II 
Ordinary Prudence Could Not Have Guarded 
Against the Receipt of Exhibit P-13. 
This Court is empowered by Rule 59(a) (3) to grant 
a new trial for suprise that ordinary prudence could not 
have guarded against. 
In Martin v. Hill, 3 Utah 157, 2 P. 62 (1882), the 
court stated that a party alleging facts constituting a 
legal surprise is bound to show them by the best evidence 
in his power, and the affidavit thereof should be made by 
the attorney, and not the client. It further said the 
verdict must be shown to be mainly attributable to the 
suprise in order to reverse a judgment therefor. 
Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 
(1952), is an example of a similar factual situation in 
which a new trial was granted for surprise. Crellin was 
an action for slander. The plaintiff claimed that she 
had been slandered because she was called a whore. The 
defense counsel made numerous inquiries but was unable 
to turn up any background on her. However, one of the 
persons whom he talked to before the trial to get back-
ground information called him after the verdict in the 
first trial and volunteered the information that the 
plaintiff's place of employment was in Ely, Nevada, as 
a dance hall girl. When this was checked out, it was 
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determined that the plaintiff had worked as a percentage 
girl in the Green Lantern and a place called Rhiney's, 
and thereafter one Harold E. Woods testified that Rhiney's 
was a good whorehouse. The defendant in Crellin was sur-
prised to learn of the background when the person who 
gave the background had previously declined to furnish 
any information. At the second trial, the jury verdict 
was returned for the defendant, and this was affirmed. 
Gull seeks to differentiate Crellin on the ground 
that it pertained to the post-trial discovery of new evi-
dence which would have aided the petitioner at trial. 
Such distinction is without merit. The issue is not 
solely whether the petition for a new trial is predica-
ted on the discovery of new evidence, but goes to the 
materiality of the event constituting the surprise and 
the magnitude of the injustice done. Hilliard, New 
Trials at 521. 
The pertinent facts show that while defense coun-
sel exercised more than "ordinary prudence" throughout 
the course of the trial, he was still unable to guard 
against the receipt of Exhibit P-13 in evidence. At no 
time prior to Gull's introduction of Exhibit P-13 were 
any facts brought to counsel's attention which would have 
put an "ordinarily prudent person" on notice that such 
evidence would be introduced. 
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Dr. Wentz aided in the preparation of Exhibit D-16, 
Gull's original reproduction cost estimate, several days 
after the alleged incident occurred. As both parties 
were aware, the document was prepared as a claim to be 
submitted against Roser. (R585) Defendant was aware of 
the circumstances and attention surrounding the prepara-
tion of that document and was led to believe that the 
amount indicated thereon would be Gull's final claim. 
Nothing which transpired thereafter gave defendant any 
cause to dispel such belief. 
In accord with ordinary prudence, defendant deposed 
Gull's alter-ego, Dr. Wentz, in an effort to avoid the 
duplication of time and expenses customarily arising when 
the same person is both deposed and compelled to answer 
interrogatories. 
Dr. Wentz testified, both in his deposition and 
then later at trial, that the alleged uniqueness of the 
lost conjugate must be credited to a specific antigen 
prepared by a Dr. Stephen St. Joer. (R267-68, 514, 606) 
Unfortunately, this special antigen had been totally 
expended in the initial iITUnunization and is now irre-
placeable. (R268, 572-73) Furthermore, Dr. Wentz tes-
tified that he had found a suitable substitute for his 
work which could be made compatible for testing purposes 
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through standard laboratory techniques. (R271-72) This 
testimony led defendant to reasonably believe that due 
to the discovery of such a readily available substitute, 
and in light of Gull's duty to mitigate damages (R66), 
the value of Gull's reproduction costs would be no more 
if not far less than the amount originally estimated in 
Exhibit D-16. 
In light of Dr. Wentz's testimony, I was very sur-
prised to find that Gull was now representing the cost 
to reproduce the conjugate as $65,197.00, far in excess 
of its original estimate of $38,308.75. Inasmuch as the 
verdict has already been shown to be attributable to the 
suprise (POINT I), these factors require a reversal of 
the trial court verdict and the granting of a new trial. 
POINT III 
The Evidence is Insufficient 
To Justify the Verdict. 
The return of a verdict based on the jurors' con-
ceptions as to the sufficiency of the evidence is clearly 
the province of the jury, subject only to the trial 
court's discretion to grant a new trial where the returned 
verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence pre-
sented. In instances where the verdict is clearly con-
trary to the permissible evidence, it is an abuse of that 
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discretion to deny the petitioning party a new trial. 
Where such an abuse is shown, the proper remedy is rever-
sal of the trial court's ruling and the granting of a 
new trial. Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 
722 (1958). 
In the instant case, the answer to Question IV of 
the Special Verdict finding that Roser was thirty per 
cent negligent in causing the loss of the conjugate is 
clearly contrary to the evidence. 
Instruction No. 12 set forth the standard by which 
the jurors were required to evaluate Elmer Meyer's actions 
while within the Gull Lab cooler. That standard is one 
of what a reasonable and prudent person would have done 
under the circumstances, the amount of caution required 
varying in accordance with the nature of the act. 
Uncontroverted evidence given during trial aptly 
illustrates Meyer's compliance with this standard. In 
order to safely service the suspended cooler, Mr. Meyer 
requested and used the aid furnished to him by Jack 
Carpenter; whether it was a portable stool or stepladder 
is unimportant. While servicing the equipment, Mr. Meyer 
carefully moved the vials and flasks in closest proximity 
to the refrigeration unit to the side in order to reduce 
the chance of jostling any of the bottles and to provide 
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a clear place for setting any necessary tools. (R664) 
Mr. Meyer further testified that while in the cooler he 
did not bump any of the shelves, nor did he hear any 
flasks tip, nor did he at any time notice any spillage. 
(R667-68) 
Gull, on the other hand, was unable to provide 
any evidence as to specific acts of negligence on Mr. 
Meyer's part while he was in the cooler. Instead, Gull 
bases its argument as to Mr. Meyer's negligence upon 
insignificant circumstantial evidence. 
Mr. Richman questioned Mr. Meyer's competence and 
care as a serviceman on the basis of his age, education, 
sight and hearing, yet was unable to establish any defi-
ciency in Mr. Meyer's proficiency as a result of any one 
of these characteristics. 
Gull introduced testimony to show that ~r. Meyer 
left dirt, grime and cigaret butts in various areas of 
the laboratory in attempting to establish an inference 
that Mr. Meyer may have been careless while servicing 
the refrigeration unit. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that despite multiple testimony as to Meyer's house-
keeping procedures during the service call, no evidence 
was introduced showing any uncleanliness or any improper 
actions within the cooler itself; no dirt, grime or ciga-
ret butts were found therein. The only evidence offered 
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by Gull as to the alleged negligent nature of Mr. Meyer's 
actions was the fact that the spilled conjugate was dis-
covered following Mr. Meyer's visit. 
Mr. Meyer testified that he was aware that the 
Gull premises were used for laboratory work. The ser-
vice he was called upon to perform, however, could hardly 
be classified as dangerous or risk-laden in nature. Fur-
ther, Mr. Meyer was never alerted to the fact that any 
particular flask containing irreplaceable material was 
present in the cooler. The mere fact that chemicals 
were contained in the cooler would not necessarily lead 
a reasonably prudent person to such an assumption. 
In light of these facts, to say that Mr. Meyer 
performed in other than a reasonable and prudent manner 
under the circumstances is clearly contrary to the evi-
dence presented. 
POINT IV 
The Damages Awarded Were Excessive 
And Unjustified Upon the Evidence. 
When the court finds a verdict is grossly dis-
proportionate to any amount of damages that could have 
been fairly awarded, it can-do one of two things. It 
can either grant a new trial unconditionally, or it can 
award a new trial conditionally unless the prevailing 
party consents to a remittitur. 
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In Wheat v. Denver & Rio Grande, 122 Utah 418, 
250 P.2d 932 (1952), the court states: 
We do not doubt that when a verdict is so 
grossly disproportionate to any amount of 
damages which could have fairly been awar-
ded as to make manifest that the verdict 
was so suffused with passion and prejudice 
that the defendant could not have had a 
fair trial on the issues, the trial court 
should unconditionally grant a new trial. 
We say this notwithstanding certain state-
ments in our cases which may be interpre-
ted to give a contrary impression. 
In Ladder v. Western Pacific Railroad, 123 Utah 
316, 259 P.2d 589 (1953), the court states: 
We * * * do not agree with the defendant's 
contention that the amount of the verdict 
was so excessive as to require a holding 
as a matter of law that the jury was actu-
ated by passion and prejudice. We recently 
said that where "the verdict is so exces-
sive as to show that it must have been 
motivated by prejudice or ill will * * * 
it should be unconditionally set aside." 
But we find no case where this court has 
held that as a matter of law passion and 
prejudice were shown merely by the exces-
sive amount of the verdict, so we have not 
indicated how great an amount or percen-
tage or reduction would be required to make 
such a showing, but we have approved reduc-
tions as high as fifty per cent, and 
required a reduction of seventy per cent 
of punitive damages, or about sixty-three 
per cent of the total verdict. * * * 
In Ladder at page 594 there was a schedule showing the 
names of cases, amounts of jury verdicts, amounts of dol-
lars of remission approved by the court, and also the 
approximate percentage of net verdict constituting remis-
sion. 
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In The State of Utah by and through its Road Com-
mission v. Kendell, 20 Utah 2d 356, 438 P.2d 178 (1968), 
the court states that the trial court may, in the exer-
cise of sound discretion, order a remittitur in lieu of 
granting a new trial where damages appear to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
In the instant case it appears clear that the 
jurors were prejudiced against the defendant. The amount 
awarded Gull, incident to the jury's acceptance of Gull's 
cost estimates in Exhibit P-13, clearly exceeds what the 
evidence shows to be a reasonable reproduction cost for 
the lost conjugate. 
Dr. Wentz testified that, following the loss of 
the conjugate, various procedures were used in attempts 
to duplicate the original conjugate. Gull first rebled 
the original goats, but determined that the required 
titer was lacking. No attempts at reirnmunization were 
made since the principal reagent, the antigen supplied 
by Dr. St. Joer, was no longer available. Commercially 
available conjugates were then tested but, according to 
Dr. Wentz, were found unsuitable. The reproduced conju-
gate for the two tests now being marketed was obtained 
through the refinement of original bleedings from the 
original goats. These bleedings had previously been 
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classified as less than optimum when compared with those 
used to produce the lost 104 mls. 
In light of these facts, Gull's estimates con-
tained in Exhibit P-13 cannot withstand scrutiny. Gull 
was compensated for the labor expended in reimmunizing 
the goats, although, upon the facts, no reimmunization 
occurred following the determination that Dr. St. Joer's 
antigen was no longer available. The same holds true for 
the costs of the reagents and goat maintenance. If bleed-
ings already in existence at the time of the loss of the 
conjugate were used, it can hardly be argued that addi-
tional expense was incurred in obtaining these bleedings. 
Even the initial rebleeding of the goats to deter-
mine the remaining potency of the serum could have resul-
ted in only minimal costs. With the testing procedures 
having already been established, and supposedly recorded, 
the determination that rebleedings from the goats would 
be unsuitable for the desired purpose would require mini-
mal effort. 
The remaining component of P-13, the labor expen-
ded by the laboratory in antiserum processing, also 
appears to be somewhat inflated. At no time during trial 
did Gull document the procedures composing this portion 
of the estimate, nor why this later estimate differed so 
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greatly from Gull's original estimate set forth in Exhi-
bit D-16. In addition, no foundation was ever laid for 
the admission into evidence of any records of documents 
which could possibly shed some light on this large dis-
crepancy. 
Inasmuch as there was no evidence from which the 
jurors could justifiably arrive at such amount, it is 
obvious that extraneous factors were taken into account. 
Likely substitutes are the passion and prejudice engen-
dered by improper testimony and argument relating to the 
loss sustained by Gull in starting up the business, the 
time setback occasioned by the loss of the conjugate, and 
the resulting loss of sales occasioned thereby. 
Furthermore, there still remains serious question 
as to the validity and alleged uniqueness of the Gull 
testing process. In awarding damages, the jurors appa-
rently ignored the testimony of Dr. Muna. His testimony 
is that commercially available conjugates were available 
which would have been sufficient for Gull's intended pur-
pose, and should Gull choose to manufacture its own con-
jugate, a conjugate of sufficiently high titer could be 
produced in any amount for approximately $1,040.00. 
The jurors must therefore have accepted Gull's 
assertion that the conjugate and testing process were 
unique. This assertion was uncorrobated by the evidence 
-30-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
presented and was directly controverted by Dr. Muna's 
testimony. The only witnesses Gull provided in attempts 
to establish the uniqueness of the system admitted to 
being unfamiliar with antihuman conjugates and to having 
never seen or tested the lost conjugate; (Rl39, 643, 649, 
670) indeed no one has outside Gull's own employees. The 
only witness who had actually used a small sample of the 
original conjugate described it not as unique, but only 
as "very acceptable." (R727) 
Serious flaws exist in Gull's own reasoning as to 
the uniqueness of the conjugate. Dr. Wentz testified as 
to the importance of careful preparation of the antigen; 
failure to make it monospecific may ruin the whole test. 
He also described the antigen prepared by Dr. St. Joer 
as a critical component of the original conjugate. 
Interestingly enough, Dr. Wentz also testified that he 
had no knowledge of the exact procedures used in Dr. St. 
Joer's preparations, nor that he had retested St. Joer's 
antigen prior to immunization of the goats. (R606) 
Dr. Wentz also testified that the specificity of 
the viral test resulted from the fact that a human anti-
body is specific for only one antigen, or human virus. 
The injected antigens in this case, however, were not 
the virus itself, but human globulins, or antibodies. 
The record is void of any evidence showing that the 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
antibodies produced in the goat's system in response to 
the injected human antibodies were specific for the virus 
being tested in the same manner as the human antibodies 
are specific for that virus. 
Both Dr. Wentz and Dr. Muna testified as to the 
difficulty of isolating a specific viral disease parti-
cle for preparation of the substrate slide. Without a 
monospecific viral particle and conjugate, non-specific 
reactions between the various viruses and antibodies 
then present would destroy the value of the test. As 
pointed out by Dr. Muna, however, the use of a red coun-
ter stain, as used by Gull, can mask any non-specific 
reactions which would occur in the test, despite the 
absence of the virus-antibody reaction you were seeking 
to obtain. (R702, 705) As a result, the important nega-
tive control aspect of the testing system is seriously 
undermined. 
The verdict was also excessive in allowing Gull 
damages for the loss of the entire 104 mls. in the face 
of evidence showing part of the solution to have been 
salvageable. Dr. Muna testified as to the laboratory 
procedures which could have been used to repurify at 
least part, if not all, of the spilled conjugate into 
a usable solution. (R706) Dr. Wentz testified, how-
ever, that he determined the spillage to be unsalvageable, 
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yet failed to refute Dr. Muna's assertions or explain why 
he had determined it to be unsalvageable. 
Dr. Muna also demonstrated how, given the size of 
the flask and viscosity of the conjugate, a substantial 
portion of the contents should have remained in the flask 
despite its tipping. (R707) In Mr. Richman and Dr. 
Wentz's repeat of the same demonstration, a smaller 
flask was used. (R821) Naturally, when the smaller 
flask is tipped, less solution would remain than when 
the larger flask is tipped. Dr. Wentz's statement that 
the conjugate remaining in the flask was "insignificant" 
was misleading inasmuch as Dr. Wentz later stated that 
even a small amount of the lost conjugate would be extremely 
valuable. (R828) 
POINT V 
The Court Committed Error in Law in 
Ruling on Admissibility of Evidence. 
When a trial court improperly receives inadmissi-
ble evidence, the court is under a duty to grant a new 
trial. The receipt into evidence, above counsel's objec-
tions, of improper exhibits or testimony, constitutes 
error in law and gives the losing party an absolute right 
to a new trial. Case law on the subject supports this 
position. 
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In Bowden v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road, 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 (1955), the court stated 
that where error is both substantial and prejudicial, and 
when there is a reasonable likelihood that the result 
would have been different without it, such error should 
be regarded as sufficient to upset a judgment or grant 
a new trial. 
In Coleman v. Dennis, 1 Wash. App. 299, 461 P.2d 
552 (1970), the Court of Appeals said that granting a 
new trial was not discretionary with the trial court if 
based upon a ruling as to the admissibility of evidence. 
In Townsend v. U. S. Rubber Company, 74 N.M. 206, 
392 P.2d 404 (1964), the New Mexico Court states that the 
proper remedy for disposing of evidence erroneously admit-
ted during the course of trial is to grant a new trial 
upon proper motion. 
As previously set forth in Point I, the court 
clearly erred in allowing the admission of Exhibit P-13 
in that no proper foundation had been established as to 
the record from which the summary was allegedly prepared. 
Further error was committed in allowing Dr. Wentz 
to testify, and Mr. Richman to argue, that the loss of 
the conjugate resulted in lost sales of $104,000. The 
evidence was permitted despite the absence of any evi-
dence establishing a market for the conjugate or that 
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any substantial quantities had ever been sold. Compounding 
the error is the fact that the court had already instructed 
Mr. Richman, in chambers, that any evidence as to lost pro-
fits or sales would be inadmissible. (R554-55) 
Defendant was further prejudiced by the court's 
allowance of Dr. Wentz's testimony concerning the loss 
incurred in starting up Gull Laboratories. Over my objec-
tion, Dr. Wentz was allowed to testify as to the costs and 
debts incurred by Gull in obtaining inventory, equipment 
and employees for the business. 
These errors of law were clearly prejudicial to the 
defendant. The returned Special Verdict awarded Gull dam-
ages in the amount of $65,197.00, an identical amount to the 
estimate set forth in Exhibit P-13. While the major cornpo-
nent of this sum, $62,400.00, was allocated to laboratory 
labor expended on serum processing (Exhibit P-13), there 
was no evidence to show what factors were taken account of 
in arriving at that amount. Dr. Wentz testified only that: 
* * * I have understated the hourly rate 
in that I set the hourly rate for labora-
tory performance--all of the employees at 
Gull Laboratories--at $60 an hour, which 
has to be the best bargain in the world. 
(R585) 
Since those same costs objected to as illustrating 
loss incurred in starting up the business, i.e., employ-
ees' salaries, inventory and equipment, are certainly 
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included in Dr. Wentz's stated reproduction cost esti-
mate, it is a reasonable assumption that the same costs 
were included in the jurors' verdict. As such the evi-
dence is prejudicial. 
Jones states: 
* * * Error being established, it is said 
that a new trial will be granted unless it 
can be seen that the admission or exclusion 
of evidence can have had no influence upon 
the jury. * * * 
4 Evidence at 1846 
The burden, then, is one of showing that the evidence 
could have had no possible influence upon the jury. Upon 
the facts herein, this burden is not met. Therefore, the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and, as such, must be 
corrected. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should grant a new trial because: 
1. The court corrunitted prejudicial error in 
receiving Exhibit P-13 in evidence; 
2. Ordinary prudence of defense counsel could 
not have guarded against the receiving of Exhibit P-13; 
3. The verdict is against the law; 
4. Insufficiency of evidence to support the jury 
verdict; 
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5. Excessive damages were awarded under the influ-
ence of passion and prejudice; 
6. Error in law was corrunitted in the receipt of 
material evidence. 
DATED this ~day of May, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
M. Be ry 
700 C tinental Bank 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
-37-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and cor-
rect copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Glen 
M. Richman, Attorney at Law, 79 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid on this ~day 
of May, 1978. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
